Findings · measured, dated, recomputable

By 30 days, 8.94% of audited MCP servers have had their installed code move while the approval artifact still matches.

How often does installed agent/MCP code drift away from the version an audit certified, and what is the drift-hazard rate an underwriter would price on?

Cite as
8.94% cumulative drift-hazard at 30 days: the installed code of an audited MCP server moved while its approval artifact still matched (Still OS Digital Holdings LLC, AI-supply-chain drift-hazard baseline, Kaplan-Meier over n=55,692 servers / 34,454 publishers, 44-day census).

The numbers

Drift-hazard at 7 days4.5%
Drift-hazard at 14 days6.21%
Drift-hazard at 30 days8.94%
Drift-hazard at 44 days12.74%
Share of transitions that drifted35.21%
Silent drift (surface moved under an unchanged version) at 30 days1.65%
Audited servers in the risk set54,776
Publishers observed34,454
Census horizon44 days

Why it matters

Cyber-risk models and AI-liability underwriters need a rating factor for how fast an audited agent drifts from what was certified, and a correlated-loss / accumulation view across the shared supply chain. Both are inputs the market says it lacks. This is a dated, recomputable baseline for exactly that: the drift hazard per horizon, plus the single-control-plane accumulation the same census measures.

Method

Kaplan-Meier cumulative incidence over a dated daily census of the MCP / agent-tool economy, censored at disappearance or horizon. A transition counts when the install fingerprint moves while the invocation fingerprint an auditor would check stays identical. Robustness is leave-one-out by publisher. Every figure re-derives from the dated series; the time series cannot be backfilled by anyone, including us.

Producer

The files these figures were derived from, on the machine that published this page

/home/marcus/state/mcp-census/drift-hazard-latest.json

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The underwriting baseline brief

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